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Heller and Constitutional Interpretation:
Originalism's Last Gasp
RORY K. LITTLE*
INTRODUCTION
What is the right theory of constitutional interpretation? As Justice
Scalia once scathingly remarked in a very different context, that question
may be "about as helpful [as saying] 'life is a fountain."" Not only are
there as many theories of constitutional interpretation as the budgets for
constitutional law professor chairs will bear, but the debate is never
ending and devoid even of measuring criteria, let alone principled
boundaries.'
Justice Scalia has also intoned, "It's a pizzazzy topic: Constitutional
Interpretation."3 (Pizzazzy-now there's a term with which I would
wager the Framers were not familiar.) Perhaps not coincidentally, it is
also the last topic of today's Friday the thirteenth Symposium-because
the topic is a bit scary, both in its intellectual breadth and depth. For
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Thanks to Thomas
Boardman, Hastings 2009, for research assistance on this piece; and for their comments (not
necessarily agreement), my colleagues Ash Bhagwat and Ethan Leib. Thanks also to the Hastings Law
Journal for the opportunity to deliver these remarks at its February 13, 2009 Symposium, and to HLJ
Senior Articles Editor David Metres for his assistance.
As Professor Sandy Levinson commented in his opening keynote remarks for this
Symposium, evaluating the effect of Supreme Court decisions is a long-term venture, and it is "too
early to tell" about Heller. See Sanford Levinson, Why Didn't the Supreme Court Take My Advice in
the Heller Case? Some Speculative Responses to an Egocentric Question, 6o HASTINGs L.J. 1291, 1305
(2009). Of course he is correct. Nevertheless, I believe it is the responsibility of an academic to
provoke and not merely to inform-particularly in the late afternoon of an all-day conference. Hence
my title, and the Essay that follows.
I. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 252 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). But
see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1129 (2003) (asserting that "there is a single, 'true' method of
constitutional interpretation").
2. Cf Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32 ("I cannot discern any principles in the pattern of the Supreme Court's
constitutional interpretations.").
3. Antonin Scalia, Constitutional Interpretation the Old Fashioned Way (Mar. 14, 2005)
(transcript available at http./www.cfif.org/htdocs/freedonmilinelcurrent/guest-commentary/scaia-constitutinal-
speech.htm).
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example, a LexisNexis search for law review articles with "constitutional
interpretation" just in their titles yields a list of 244 articles in the past
thirty years, produced by some of the finest minds in the academy.
Indeed, merely the semantics of constitutional interpretive schools
can be mind-boggling. There are textualists;5 structuralists; doctrinalists;7
strict constructionists;' "loose constructionists;" 9 and originalists of many
different types:". "skyscraper,"" "framework,""2 faint-hearted,'3 lefty,'4
negative, progressive, "abduced-principle,"' 6  and even living
originalists. There are text- and principle-ists, living constitutionalists,'9
pragmatists,"° and those who advocate "the philosophic approach."" No
4. The search was in the "Law Reviews, CLE, Legal Journals & Periodicals, Combined"
database for "TITLE ("constitutional interpretation")" and was date restricted to the last thirty years.
The search was conducted on April 16, 2009.
5. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (1997) ("Textualism should not be
confused with so-called strict constructionism, a degraded form of textualism that brings the whole
philosophy into disrepute.").
6. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1969); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE (1995).
7. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, The New Doctrinalism in Constitutional Scholarship and
District of Columbia v. Heller, 75 TENN. L. REV. 789, 790-93 (2008); David A. Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 (1996).
8. See Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms with Strict and Liberal Construction, 64 ALB. L.
REV. 9 (200O).
9. See id.
io. See generally JONATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005).
II. Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 549,
550 (2009) (coining both the "skyscraper" and "framework" labels). In this typically provocative
article, Professor Balkin begins with the startling claim, in his very first sentence, that "[o]riginal
meaning originalism and living constitutionalism are compatible positions." Id. at 549.
12. Id.
13. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989); see Randy E.
Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted" Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2oo6).
14. See Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
353, 353 (20O7).
15. See Jess Bravin, Rethinking Original Intent, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 14, 2009, at W3 .
16. See, e.g., Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the "Challenge of Change": Abduced-Principle
Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates Changed Social
Conditions, 6o HASTINGS L.J. 927, 930 (2009).
17. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE. L.J. (forthcoming Nov. 2009)
(manuscript at 58), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=io9o282 ("Originalism ... is... a loose
collection of a staggering array of often inconsistent approaches ....").
18. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 295 (2008).
19. See Leib, supra note 14.
20. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY (2002); R.
George Wright, Dependence and Hierarchy Among Constitutional Theories, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 141,
I44 (2004).
21. In their book on constitutional interpretation, Professors Sotirios Barber and James Fleming
canvass a number of these methods and come down in favor of "the philosophic approach," which
they liken to Ronald Dworkin's "moral reading" of the Constitution. SoiRlos A. BARBER & JAMES E.
FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS Xiii (2OO7) (citing RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996)).
1416 [Vol. 6o:1415
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doubt the scholars here today could easily add a half dozen or more
other labels to my list. Moreover, "originalism" is hardly a unified or
monolithic theory. Professors Thomas Colby and Peter Smith have
recently demonstrated that the rifts within the "originalist" camp are
deep and many."
In his 1997 book A Matter of Interpretation, Justice Scalia-perhaps
the most accomplished legal scholar ever to sit on the Supreme Court3 -
described the "Great Divide" in constitutional interpretation: "that
between original meaning (whether derived from the Framers' intent or
not) and current meaning."'  Justice Scalia is, of course, no fan of the
latter, and spends the remainder of his essay deriding the extreme straw
man concept that he has thereby created. Of course, no one believes that
some "current" meaning of the Constitution solely must govern,
unmoored to any facet of text or history, any more than Justice Scalia
believes that pure originalism should control. 5
More to the point, however, is the fact that Justice Scalia's
dichotomy is a false one. In reality, the Maoist metaphor of "let a
thousand flowers bloom" more accurately describes the landscape of
constitutional-interpretative theory. Not only are there dozens of
competing theories and nuances within theories, but new theories
continue to be presented and old ones evolve, two centuries after
Marbury v. Madison," presenting new labels and ideas."7
Today, the Heller majority opinion may demonstrate that it is
originalism that is currently "ascendant."' 8 Yet the implications of
Heller's almost purely originalist approach for future constitutional
interpretive questions are far from clear. In fact, I will briefly argue that
the implications of the Heller majority opinion demonstrate that its
purely originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, and indeed
22. Colby & Smith, supra note 17 (manuscript at 4). To be fair, this is also true of originalism's
doppelganger, "living constitutionalism." Compare Leib, supra note 14, with Balkin, supra note 12.
23. By this I mean to describe highly-regarded law professors who then served with distinction on
the Court. Some would no doubt prefer Justice Felix Frankfurter for this honorific. Other nominees
might include Justices Stephen Breyer and Louis Brandeis.
24. SCALIA, supra note 5, at 38.
25. Scalia, supra note 13 (explaining that his brand of originalism is "faint-hearted" because,
among other things, "in a crunch" he could not uphold "a statute that imposes the punishment of
flogging," even if the punishment were accepted at the time of the Eighth Amendment's framing).
26. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
27. E.g., Balkin, supra note 12; see also ALAN GIBSON, INTERPRETING THE FOUNDING: GUIDE TO THE
ENDURING DEBATES OVER THE ORIGINS AND FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC vii (2oo6)
("Scholarship on the American Founding continues to be produced at an unprecedented pace.").
28. As Professor Ethan Leib recently wrote, "It certainly seems like the originalists are winning."
Leib, supra note 14. But see SCALIA, supra note 5, at 38 (claiming in 1997 that it is the "Living
Constitution" approach to constitutional interpretation that is "ascendant"). Of course, today's
apparent ascendancy of "originalism" is due largely, if not entirely, to Justice Scalia's immense
intellectual influence in this field.
June 2009]
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the majority opinion itself-as well as Justice Scalia personally-are
moved by necessity toward a theory more akin to "living
constitutionalism" than originalism.
I. HELLER: THICK AND PURE ORIGINALISM
Heller's originalism is both "thick" and "pure." By this, I mean that
its laborious historical detail is unprecedented for a constitutional
Supreme Court decision (it is thus "thick" with historical detail); and the
decision's constitutional analysis begins and ends solely with that history,
making it "purely" originalist. My contention is that the unprecedented
thickness and single-minded purity of Heller's originalism are in fact
indicators of its morbidity. Heller in fact is the "last gasp" of originalism.
I say Heller is originalism's "last gasp"29 in the sense of being a much
heavier, almost desperate, attempt to give life to the subject-just before
the subject expires.30
In this sense-the sense of a deep, huge, expiring gasp-the
historiography in Heller seems quite overblown. No prior Supreme Court
decision has ever gone to such great depth or length to mine the
historical sources in its search for meaning. Now, Judge Wilkinson
attributes this to "law office history"3' - the strained efforts of advocates,
and the legions of law clerks and researchers at the Court's disposal, to
find every shred of evidence that might support their position (as
opposed to an unbiased search for all sources).32 One might also add to
this the immense and easily accessible wealth of materials now
searchable via the Internet. But even after one slogs through all forty-
five slip opinion pages of the Heller majority's historical effort, the
impression is one of much more heat than light. Moreover, any overall
feeling one might have of being impressed is quickly dispelled by Justice
Stevens's equally impressive (if also equally one-sided), and directly
contrary, historiography in dissent.33
Moreover, Heller is more purely, more single-mindedly, originalist
than any prior constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court. Even
when the Court mines history for original meaning, it usually follows
29. See The Free Online Dictionary, http://www.thefreedictionary.comlast+gasp (last visited June
10, 2009) ("LAST GASP-the point of death or exhaustion or completion; 'the last gasp of the cold war'
end, ending-the point in time at which something ends").
30. Cf J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L.
REV. 253, 256 (2OO9) ("While Heller can be hailed as a triumph of originalism, it can just as easily be
seen as the opposite .... ).
31. See, e.g., John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 193, 196 0993).
32. See Wilkinson, supra note 3o, at 271-72.
33. As Judge Wilkinson noted in his masterful Heller critique published-on the web-quickly
after the decision itself, "For every persuasive thrust by one side, the other has an equally persuasive
parry.... It is hard to look at all this evidence and come away thinking that one side is clearly
right ...." Id. at 271.
1418 [Vol. 6o:I1415
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with a discussion of other "modalities" as Professor Ethan Leib terms
them-doctrine, consequences, prudence, practice, even morality. 4 Not
so in Heller. Once the majority is done with history, it is done-with only
an over-the-shoulder nod to more recent precedents, and a dismissive
one-sentence reference, without even an attempt at substantive rebuttal,
to Justice Breyer's "exhaustive discussion of the arguments for and
against gun control. 3
5
In fact, it may easily be claimed that no prior Supreme Court
decision of constitutional interpretation has ever been so single-mindedly
limited to a purely historical analysis. Rather than provide a comparative
string cite of prior constitution-interpreting decisions, I challenge the
reader to propose any other such decision that rests, so solely and in such
exhaustive historical detail, on eighteenth-century history.
II. HELLER'S UNSUPPORTED EXCEPTIONS: ORIGINALISM's LAST GASP
Heller is also a "last gasp," however, because even as it proclaims
textual originalism more loudly and purely than any prior constitutional
decision, it ultimately leaves originalism behind. As the last breath leaves
the originalist body of Heller, a ghost-like image of "living
constitutionalism" arises, wraith-like, from the corpse. In a transparent
effort to not upset the present-day order too much (whatever the
"original meaning" may have been), Justice Scalia offers this plainly un-
originalist - as well as unsupported by any citation - closing thought:
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today
of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings,[16] or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. 7
Judge Wilkinson has already amply chided the majority for this non-
originalist "judicial lawmaking.... The Constitution's text, at least, has
as little to say about restrictions on firearm ownership by felons as it does
about the trimesters of pregnancy. ' .a. And in today's Symposium,
Professor Carlton Larson's wonderful historical exegesis for what he calls
34. Leib, supra note 14, at 358, 361 (citing PHILIP C. BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 13-
14(991)).
35. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2812-16, 2821 (2008). The majority simply
states, "After an exhaustive discussion of the arguments for and against gun control, Justice Breyer
arrives at his interest-balanced answer ... ." Id. at 2821. The majority then simply objects to such a
"freestanding 'interest-balancing' approach" without discussing any substantive arguments in rebuttal
to Justice Breyer's claims. Id.
36. Or airports. One can only wonder (smile) why the Framers did not mention airports, clearly a
"sensitive place" where government might sensibly ban guns, in their Second Amendment debates.
37. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17.
38. Wilkinson, supra note 30, at 273.
June 20091
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the "four Heller exceptions" demonstrates the lack of originalist
support.39 But I think the majority's unexplained endorsement of
exceptions shows more than "judicial lawmaking." In fact, it
demonstrates that even the purest originalist cannot resist the tug to
implement, nay, to transport, the "original meaning" into the context and
experience of our living age.
III. ORIGINALISM GONE WILD: EVEN THE HELLER DISSENTERS
That the constitutional interpretive approach employed by the
majority in Heller is an originalist one seems to be widely accepted.
There are well over a dozen scholarly articles that have been generated,
in only the first eight months since Heller was decided, with the word
"originalist" or "originalism" in the title.'n The majority opinion begins
and virtually ends (except for the unexplained exceptions) entirely on the
historical, originalist battlefield. Thus, Justice Scalia begins by explaining
that the interpretive task for the Court is to discover how "[t]he
Constitution was written to be understood by the voters"" -voters in
1791, not in 1976 (when the law in Heller was enacted"'), or in 2009. Fifty
slip opinion pages later-pages filled mainly with history and nineteenth-
century dictionaries, as well as a brief discussion of precedent and then
some rebuttal of the dissenting opinions-the majority concludes, again
with history overcoming current realities: "Undoubtedly some think that
the Second Amendment is outmoded in a society where our standing
army is the pride of our Nation, where well-trained police forces provide
personal security, and where gun violence is a serious problem."43 But
whatever one may think of these points, says Justice Scalia, it "is not
debatable," and "it is not the role of this Court," to allow current
realities to overcome the Court's 5-4 view of history." Tough noogies,
says Justice Scalia: historical originalism prevails.
More surprising, perhaps, than the majority's pure originalism, is the
seemingly complete concession of this ground to the Court by the
principal Heller dissent. Indeed, there is no strong voice for the "Living
Constitution" to be found in the ninety pages comprising two dissents in
Heller.' No Justice Warren or Brennan, let alone Douglas, to champion
39. Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller
and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 6o HASTINGS L.J. 1371 (2009).
40. Search on LexisNexis in "Law Reviews, CLE, Legal Journals & Periodicals, Combined" with
source string [TITLE("original!") & Heller] and date restricted from June 26, 2oo8 to present. The
search was conducted on April 6, 2009.
41. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S.
716, 7310(930)).
42. Id. at 2854 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the history of the D.C. statute at issue).
43. Id. at 2822 (majority opinion).
44. Id.
45. See id. at 2822-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2847-70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 6o: 14151420
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the "evolving standards of decency" regarding handguns in the home. 6
Indeed, Justice Stevens's principal dissent is entirely directed at trying to
beat Justice Scalia on his own ground-a well-done, but ultimately
fruitless, tilting at the Champion of Originalism.47
Even Justice Breyer's pragmatic, twenty-first century discussion of
handgun dangers and control proceeds under a muted version of the
Warren Court's unabashed contemporarianism"a Justice Breyer begins
with his own eighteenth-century historical examples.49 He takes on the
majority on more pragmatic grounds only after this," and only in an
academic "even assuming they are right" sort of way." This is hardly a
ringing endorsement of a possible "living constitutionalist" position: that,
perhaps, the Framers intended the Second Amendment to "evolve" to
meet modem realities as weaponry, police forces, the army, and militia,
all changed and improved since 1789.52
How different this constitutional interpretive approach looks, as I
briefly examine below, from any of the Supreme Court's prior decisions
mining other Bill of Rights provisions. And this is true from the
46. Chief Justice Earl Warren first advanced the phrase "evolving standards of decency" to
describe from whence the "[Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning" in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, ioi (1958). Over the next thirty years, Justice Brennan carried on and developed the concept,
perhaps as best described in his 1985 Georgetown lecture. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433 (1986) (originally
delivered as speech at Georgetown University).
47. Justice Stevens's dissent presents forty-five slip opinion pages of history and discussion of
precedent. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Acknowledging that Justice
Stevens argued entirely on history, Judge Richard Posner believes Justice Stevens had the better of the
argument. Posner, supra note 2, at 35. But whatever one may think of the persuasive force of Justice
Stevens's historicism, the point remains that he lost 5-4 in the vote that mattered. Cf. MIGUEL DE
CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE 58-59 (Edith Grossman trans., 2003) (1615) (another knight-errant tilting at
windmills). The honorific "Champion of Originalism" is my own invention.
48. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting). By "contemporarianism," if I am coining
this term, I mean the use of an interpretive lens that is informed by contemporary realities and a
society and world increasingly distant from the Framers' time. At the height of the non-originalist
Warren Court era in the i96os, Chief Justice Earl Warren was famous for asking, at oral argument, "is
it fair?" See Roger J. Traynor, Chief Justice Warren's Fair Question, 58 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (1969). The lack
of regard for historical originalism in that simple and often dispositive question, is apparent.
49. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2848-50 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 2850 ("[T]o answer the questions that are raised ... requires us to focus on
practicalities .... ").
51. See id. To be sure, Justice Breyer does not think that history supports the majority. But his
constitutional analysis proceeds by noting only that "to raise a self-defense question is not to answer
it," but merely to begin the interpretive enterprise. Id. The majority, of course, posits self-defense as
the Second Amendment (if nonliteral) answer, not a question.
52. To be fair, Justice Breyer does in the end ask a "living constitutionalist" question: "how
should [the Second Amendment] be applied to modem-day circumstances that [the Framers] could
not have anticipated?" Id. at 2870. He then poses some of these circumstances, and states that
"[u]nless we believe that [the Framers] intended future generations to ignore such matters,.... [o]ne
cannot answer those questions by combining inconclusive historical research with judicial ipse dixit."
June 2009]
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viewpoint of any prior generation, back into the nineteenth century-
even of Chief Justice John Marshall, a contemporary of the Framers-
and not just of the Warren Court's decisions.
IV. LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM: NOT A NEW THEORY
A brief aside: Justice Scalia has recently declaimed that "living
constitutionalism" is a new, twentieth-century interpretive method, and
that "originalism" is the Framers' one true faith.3 I think there is
considerable reason to doubt this historical claim, and that an
examination of the Supreme Court's pre-Civil War constitutional
discussions would demonstrate that much more than "originalism" was
going on. Recall on this point the Court's broad and nonliteral
interpretation of the "Necessary and Proper" Clause in McCulloch v.
Maryland.4 Or Chief Justice Marshall's famous nonliteral, and possibly
non-originalist, declaration in Marbury that it is the province of the
Supreme Court to say, supremely, what the law is.55 At the very least,
important structuralist and other policy-oriented discussions are present
even in these early constitutional interpretations.
And one can hardly forget Justice Holmes's dramatic assertion,
almost ioo years ago, of a "living Constitutionalist" approach in Missouri
v. Holland, interpreting the Tenth Amendment:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like
the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have
called into life a being the development of which could not have been
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough
for them to realize or to hope that they had created an
organism .... The case before us must be considered in the light of our
whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred
years ago.... We must consider what this country has become in
deciding what [the Tenth] Amendment has reserved.
But for specific examples of other Bill of Rights constitutional
interpretation decisions, let us look at three hopefully familiar examples,
rendered by the Court many generations apart, starting over 120 years
ago. It is unsurprising, perhaps, that my somewhat arbitrarily chosen
examples are criminal procedure cases. The Bill of Rights, where the
Second Amendment is found, is heavily occupied with criminal
procedure rights. It is also what I teach-I call it "Con Law Ill.""7 But I
53. See generally Scalia, supra note 3.
54. 17 U.S. ( Wheat.) 316, 324 (1819).
55. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( Cranch) 137,177 (i8o3).
56. 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920) (emphasis added); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 978
(1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe wisdom of the Framers was to anticipate that the Nation would
grow and new problems of governance would require different solutions."); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
57. This is by reference to the canon at many law schools, to teach "Constitutional Law I:
[Vol. 6o:i141 5
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believe my point would be well represented were we to examine civil
First, Fifth, or Seventh Amendment decisions as well."
A. BOYD V. UNITED STATES
For example, over 120 years ago, when the Court first addressed, in
its i886 Boyd decision, the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as
applied to the compelled production of documents, it noted that the
practice was new, in 1863, and unprecedented in the United States or
Great Britain." The Court said it could find no relevant "contemporary
construction of the Constitution," but there was no examination of
history or sources to demonstrate this.6° The Court did recite the general
history that led the Framers to propose the Fourth Amendment-
discontent with the British "general" and nonjudicial writs of
assistance-but only for the "principles" it laid down for interpretation
and application of the Amendment.' (This approach is echoed in Justice
Stevens's Heller dissent, when he discusses the history that led to the
Second Amendment for the principles it yields, rather than for its precise
historical content.62) The Boyd Court then wrote its famous (if now
slightly devalued by the overruling of Boyd's specific holdings63)
nontextual and non-originalist description of the Fourth Amendment's
spirit: "It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion
of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property.., this sacred right."' 4
Structure and Powers" and "Constitutional Law II: Individual Rights and Liberties." The standard
criminal procedure course (unlike its civil procedure equivalent) focuses almost entirely on the
constitutional rights found in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.
58. Not to mention the Tenth Amendment. See supra text accompanying note 56. For a modem
example of the Court taking into account modem-day realities when interpreting constitutional text in
a civil-law context, see Justice Scalia's own majority opinion for the Court under the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992)
(endorsing the view, first espoused by Justice Holmes, "that if the protection against physical
appropriations of private property was to be meaningfully enforced, the government's power to
redefine the range of interests included in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained by
constitutional limits" (emphasis added)).
59. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 6j6, 622-23 (r886).
6o. Id. at 622.
6I. Id. at 624-26, 630.
62. E.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822, 2831-36 (20o8) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
63. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 6o5 (984); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976);
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
64. Boyd, t6 U.S. at 630.
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B. POWELL V. ALABAMA
Two generations, ten Presidents, and twenty-nine Justices 6s after
Boyd's non-originalist constitutional interpretive approach, the Court
again confronted for the first time the assertion of a Bill of Rights
protection in another unprecedented context. In Powell v. Alabama, the
African American defendants known as the "Scottsboro Boys" asserted
that they had been denied the right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment, even though they in fact had had counsel for their one-day
"trial" and had failed to retain a lawyer-not actively been denied a
66lawyer-prior to the start of trial. These defendants were, of course,
indigent, and the racial politics of the day and place were
overwhelmingly obvious in their draconian and unjust treatment. 67 But
the Court hardly adverted to these realities, and instead found that the
Sixth Amendment (well, technically the Fourteenth 6) required not only
that the defendants have the assistance of counsel during the pre-trial
preparation period, itself a nontextual interpretation, but also that-truly
nontextual, and surely a non-originalist horror of horrors-the State had
to pay for their lawyer(s).6 9 Whatever else the Framers may have meant,
and the 1791 or 1868 ratifiers understood, in the Sixth Amendment, they
surely had no inkling that the provision would require the government to
pay for the assistance of counsel.
Again, the correctness of this constitutional conclusion is not the
object of my attention. Rather, the interpretive method is. In concluding
that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the "assistance of counsel" in
"all criminal prosecutions '70 extended to the pre-trial investigative
period, the Court did not even advert to the existence of an originalist,
historical perspective. It simply examined the facts of the case and
concluded that "[t]o decide otherwise, would simply be to ignore
actualities., 7' Then, to determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment's
conception of "due process" encompassed the right to counsel, the Court
looked to the historical fact that a right to counsel in at least capital
65. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW lxxxii-xcii (5th ed. 2005) (chart of
Justices and Presidents).
66. 287U.S. 45,56-58(1932).
67. The use of "boys" itself evidenced the prejudices of the time. See generally JAMES GOODMAN,
STORIES OF SCOrSBORO (1995).
68. Powell was decided before the incorporation doctrine was adopted by the Supreme Court,
and thus Powell discussed "due process" rather than the Sixth Amendment directly. See 287 U.S. at
65-66.
69. This is the practical effect of the Court's holding in Powell that the failure "to make an
effective appointment of counsel was.., a denial of due process," 287 U.S. at 71, and was later made
explicit by the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 375 (1963).
70. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
71. Powell, 287 U.S. at 58.
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criminal prosecutions was recognized by "twelve of the thirteen
colonies."7 That was the extent of the Court's historiography; there was
no examination of anything the Framers, of either the Sixth or the
Fourteenth Amendments,73 might have thought, said, or understood
about the topic.
C. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA
Finally, in a quintessential display of a markedly different
constitutional interpretive method, we can examine the Court's 1966
decision in Miranda v. Arizona.74 It will cause no surprise, and requires
little demonstration, to assert that the Miranda Court did not employ a
historical, textual, or originalist approach. After briefly quoting an earlier
decision outlining the British hostility to compelled confessions,75 Chief
Justice Warren's opinion for the Court was off to the "living
constitutionalist" races: discussion of contemporary police practices,
prior efforts to reign them in, "experience in some other countries, ' ' , 6 and
the Court's recent precedents, led firmly, if not originalistically, to the
constitutional meaning of the Fifth Amendment as applied to custodial
law enforcement interrogations.
Now, one might simply reject Miranda as wrongly decided-
although when confronted with that very question forty years later, one
of Miranda's strongest original critics, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist,
instead endorsed the constitutional status of Miranda's nontextual, non-
originalist rules." His opinion in Dickerson v. United States was itself
remarkably un-originalist, even going so far as to rely on television and
motion pictures, hardly within the Framers' contemplation."' But right or
wrong, it is Miranda that is more representative of the Court's
constitutional interpretive approach over the centuries: a discussion of
consequences, policies, and modern day realities, in addition to history
and sometimes in contravention of it. Originalism simply has not been
the standard. Instead, when accurately viewed in the light of
constitutional history,79 originalism represents Justice Scalia's almost
single-handed, late-twentieth and twenty-first century effort to stem the
72. Id. at 64.
73. The Sixth Amendment was ratified in 1791. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in i868.
74. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
75. Id. at 442-43, 459.
76. Id. at 486 (another Justice Scalia bugaboo); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 55!, 608
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment,
any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be determined by the
subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I dissent.").
77. Cf Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 446 (i974) (stating, in opinion written by Justice
Rehnquist, that the Miranda warnings are "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but
[are] instead" merely "prophylactic" judge-made rules).
78. 530 U.S. 428, 443-44 (2oo0).
79. Of course I recognize, and enjoy, the smiling irony of this phrase.
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tide and shift the battleground, in the face of a relatively steady "living"
interpretive approach, and creeping and increasingly different modem
day realities."
No doubt my selection of three Bill of Rights cases from the past
many generations of constitutional interpretation is arbitrary; but I do
not think it unrepresentative. Perhaps I am belaboring an obvious point:
Heller's interpretive method is different -different from any similar
constitutional opinion the Court has ever issued, in its single-minded,
beginning-to-end, reliance on originalist history and analysis. Does this
make it illegitimate? Hardly. But its very intensity should give pause to
anyone who thinks Heller will henceforth represent the Court's exclusive
constitutional interpretive approach. "The lady doth protest too much,
methinks" is the Shakespearean jibe when one's overblown denials
actually suggest admission."' Heller's overblown originalism actually
hides its non-originalist approach. It is a powerful last gasp, dooming the
theory to the archives as we draw further and further away into realities
the Framers did not and could not foresee. Assault weapons and M-i6s
in the hand of felons and the criminally insane? Not on any anyone's
watch, originalist or otherwise."s
V. WE ARE ALL "LIVING ORIGINALISTS"
Now, I should rush to note that this Essay is not a broadside attack
on the use of history, or text, or the thinking of the Framers as aids to
constitutional interpretation. I certainly believe that text and history are,
appropriately, the starting point (and even the end in some cases) of
constitutional interpretation. 3 Neither is mine a claim that the
Constitution is entirely open ended, with an entirely new meaning
possible in every generation. 4 Rather, I focus my guns (another bad pun)
only on the purely originalist approach of Heller, lacking any discussion
of, and refusing to acknowledge any relevance for, modern-day realities.
I find that approach to be unprecedented, overblown, and in fact
representative of the death rattle of a purely originalist approach.
8o. See Barnett, supra note 13, at 9 (noting that Justice Scalia was "perhaps the first defender of
originalism" to advance the modem-day conception of the approach); Colby & Smith, supra note 17
(manuscript at 7) (describing Justice Scalia as a leader in the campaign to defend and revitalize
originalism).
81. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLEI act 3, sc. 2, at 242-43 (Jack R. Crawford eds., Yale Univ.
Press 1917).
82. After drafting this Essay, I was pleased to receive a copy of a new book which substantially
agrees with the views on constitutional interpretation discussed herein. See GOODWIN LiU ET AL.,
KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
83. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, io8 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1233, 1279 (1995).
84. Professor Leib's description of his own constitutional interpretive theory perhaps approaches
this expansive view. See Leib, supra note 14, at 370.
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Indeed, the necessity for even the Champion of Originalism to be a
closet Living Constitutionalist is exposed directly in Heller. In the end,
Heller's analysis is itself plainly non-originalist. After referring only, if
exhaustively, to history to establish the "original meaning" of the Second
Amendments, - and then asserting that that meaning is binding, simply
by the fact that it was clear in 17986-Justice Scalia's opinion suddenly
lurches into the twenty-first century. Noting that "we do not undertake
an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second
Amendment" _-and this modesty is unbecoming, since there is
absolutely no historical analysis for what follows-Justice Scalia then
endorses all of the modem-day restrictions on gun ownership that we
have come to accept without question, going so far as to declare them
"presumptively lawful."
While the majority's un-cite-supported list of exceptions to the
"original meaning" draws on commonsense and modern-day
experience,89 the assertion that the list is "presumptively lawful"-
without any originalist analysis whatsoever-comes entirely out of thin
air. Indeed, it is activist living constitutionalism at its best: the Second
Amendment must be interpreted to permit restrictions that America's
evolution has demonstrated are sensible and necessary. History must
give way to reality. The dead hands of the Framers-whether or not their
children took their hunting guns to school with them'°-cannot govern
the living two centuries hence.9'
VI. JUSTICE SCALIA'S OWN NON-ORIGINALISM
Moreover, although he would surely contest this point, Justice Scalia
has hardly been consistent in his constitutional interpretive approach.
Two criminal procedure cases which he has authored in the twenty-first
century-Kyllo v. United States92 and Blakely v. Washington93 -perhaps
best demonstrate this point.
In Kyllo, holding that the detection of heat energy outside of a house
by officers using a "thermal imager" on a public street constituted a
85. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788-804 (2o08).
86. See, e.g., id. at 2822 ("We are aware of the problem of handgun violence in this country,...
[b]ut the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.");
id. at 2817 ("[T]he fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory
clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.").
87. Id. at 2816.
88. Id. at 2816 n.26.
89. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing these exceptions).
9o. Lacking any specific historical support for this imagery, I must leave it to the reader's
imagination for evaluation of its plausibility.
9I.Cf Leib, supra note 14, at 359 ("Living constitutionalists are plagued by anxiety about the
dead hand of the past.").
92. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
93. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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Fourth Amendment "search," Justice Scalia began by noting the
"advance of technology" ("technology": another term not found in the
Framers' lexicon), then discussed the nontextual concept of "privacy" as
"secured" by the Fourth Amendment-shades of the radical Douglas! -
and then posited, far from the actual "Question Presented" in the case,
that "[t]he question we confront today is what limits there are upon this
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy."' Surely
at this moment, Justice Scalia was not himself, but was rather channeling
the spirit of the living constitutionalist Justice Brennan, only recently
departed from this Earth."
But then, only four years later in Blakely, Justice Scalia found
himself again overcome by the spirits of an "evolving Constitution."
Applying the already wildly nontextual Sixth Amendment rule of
Apprendi v. New Jersey that "any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum [sentence] must be
submitted to a jury" not to a judge, 6 Justice Scalia confronted the
question how this rule might apply to mandatory criminal sentencing
regulations that require imposition of sentences well within a statutory
maximum.97 With typical chutzpah (another non-originalist concept),
Justice Scalia proclaimed that "[o]ur precedents make clear" the answer
to this question: of course, Apprendi applies to mandatory guideline
sentencing facts within-not just "beyond"-a statutory maximum. 98 But
it was Justice Scalia's explanation for reaching this nontextual (not to
mention non-obvious) result that demonstrates his closet living
constitutionalism: "Our [result] ... reflects ... the need to give
intelligible content to the right of jury trial."99 While invoking "the
Framers" at every point (as though he had a direct texting, not textual,
relationship with them), Justice Scalia is forced to explain that his
opinion in Blakely actually "carries out [the Framers'] design,"'" not that
94. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-35.
95. Justice Brennan died in 1997. His approach to constitutional interpretation was perhaps most
broadly laid out in his 1985 Georgetown lecture. See Brennan, supra note 46.
96. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
97. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004). Of course, the concept of sentencing
guidelines was not within the Framers' ken, let alone intention. The Framers were, however-and
contrary to Apprendi's erroneous historical claim, see 530 U.S. at 482-84-familiar with discretionary
sentencing ranges, since they enacted a number of them in 179o, and understood that judges would be
choosing sentences within those ranges. See Rory K. Little & Theresa Chen, The Lost History of
Apprendi and the Blakely Petition for Rehearing, 17 FED. SENT'G. REP. 69, 69 (2oo4) ("IT]he Framers
themselves wrote over a dozen indeterminate sentencing ranges in the first federal crime bill ......
(citing Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 1-29, 1 Stat. 112, 112-18)).
98. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04. The idea that this was "clear" from Apprendi was belied not just
by the textual language of Apprendi- "beyond" hardly, let alone clearly, means "within"-but also by
the fact that most lower courts had concluded oppositely, not to mention the Court's own 5-4 split in
Blakely. See id. at 320 n.1 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting sixteen contrary decisions).
99. Id. at 305 (majority opinion).
Ioo. Id. at 3o6.
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it can be textually, intentionally, or originally located in the actual
blueprint they wrote.'0 '
Thus, Justice Scalia's "originalism," when confronted with cases the
Framers simply could not have anticipated (thermal heat imaging
technology in Kyllo; legislatively-developed sentencing guidelines in
Blakely), is flexible enough to accommodate debatable conceptions of a
constitutional "design" and the influence of unanticipated technology on
the nontextual rights of privacy. Such analysis-and I am by no means
contending that Justice Scalia was wrong in these interpretations -brings
Justice Scalia remarkably close to his "Living Constitution"
predecessors.
CONCLUSION
It has recently become fashionable to suggest that originalism and
living constitutionalism are not actually so incompatible.' 2 While there
may be much to recommend this view, my point is different. It is not that
originalism actually has aspects of living constitutionalism in it, but
rather that originalism, in its pure form as represented in Heller, is an
inadequate and dying methodology. Its immediate attraction -discerning
firmly-rooted rules and meanings that do not change over time -must
necessarily fade as time marches on. What the Framers said, envisioned,
or meant cannot plausibly continue as the specific and exclusive meaning
given to general words and phrases in the Constitution, as we grow
farther and farther away from the culture, realities, and understandings
that underlay the Framers' words." And unless we believe that Chief
Justice Marshall was wrong about his contemporaries, and that they did
NOT intend their document to last for many generations beyond their
own, I°4 we must believe that originalism (at least in its pure form) cannot
last. Instead, the exhaustive exposition of the method in Heller actually
represents its last gasp. I predict, with respect to Professor Sanford
Levinson, °" that we shall not see the likes of Heller again. The force of
modern and evolving realities is too strong, and the tether of meanings
ioi. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 0952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("[The Constitution] must be understood as an Eighteenth-Century sketch of a government hoped for,
not as a blueprint of the Government that is.").
102. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note I I, at i ; Posner, supra note 2, at i. But see Leib, supra note 14.
io3. This is simply a less articulate articulation of Justice Holmes's view as expressed in Missouri v.
Holland. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
104. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821) ("[A] constitution is framed for
ages to come, and is designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach
it."); cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2870 (2oo8) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Framers could not have intended future generations to ignore such matters as guns near parks
and playgrounds, guns accessible to minors at home, and the plague of gun suicides and urban gun
violence).
Io5. See Levinson, supra note *; Adam Liptak, Few Ripples from Supreme Court Ruling on Guns,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2oo9, at A14.
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that held in a long-ago age is ever-weakening-even for the originalists
that wrote Heller.
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